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GIVING STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT THE BENEFIT OF THE
DOUBT: HOW TO ENSURE VCCR
COMPLIANCE WITHOUT JUDICIAL
REMEDIES
Victoria M. Lee*
INTRODUCTION
Under Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (―VCCR‖), the United States agreed to notify the
consulate of a foreign national of any arrest or detainment should
he so request, and furthermore, to inform all arrested and detained
foreign nationals of their ―right‖ to consular notification. 1 Article
* Brooklyn Law School Class of 2010; B.A., Gettysburg College, 2005.
Thanks to: the Journal of Law and Policy members for their hard work; my
family, not only for their continued support, but also for their understanding in
dealing with my busy schedule; and my friends for reminding me to take a break
now and again.
1
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular functions
relating to nationals of the sending State:
...
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the receiving State
shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or
committed to prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the consular post by
the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities
shall inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this
sub-paragraph.
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations art. 36(1)(b), Dec. 14, 1969, 21
U.S.T. 77, 596 U.N.T.S. 261 [hereinafter VCCR].
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36 of the VCCR—the communications provision—has recently
been the center of both national and international controversy. 2 The
debate has largely centered on three issues: whether this section
confers any individually enforceable rights, how it should be
implemented, and how it should be enforced. 3 United States courts
have come to little consensus on any of these questions. 4 The
Supreme Court started the debate on individually enforceable
rights with a passing comment in Breard v. Greene that the VCCR
―arguably confers on an individual the right to consular assistance
following arrest.‖5 The Court, however, has yet to confirm or deny
the existence of privately enforceable rights under Article 36.6
The United States Courts of Appeals and state courts have
largely ignored the question in the criminal context by assuming
that even if the VCCR conferred individual rights, whatever
remedy sought was an inappropriate measure given the violation. 7
Having been effectively barred in many instances from challenging
a violation of Article 36 with respect to their criminal convictions,
an increasing number of convicted foreign nationals are pursuing
civil remedies for a violation of their rights under the laws of the
United States.8 The circuit courts have been more willing to
confront the question of individually enforceable rights head-on,

2

See generally Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853 (9th Cir.
2007); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27); Avena and Other
Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12 (March 31).
3
See, e.g., Cornejo, 504 F.3d 853; LaGrand, 2001 I.C.J. 466; Avena, 2004
I.C.J. 12.
4
See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing the split
of the Courts of Appeals).
5
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
6
See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008); Sanchez-Llamas
v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 343 (2006).
7
E.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 60 (1st Cir. 2000) (―[I]rrespective
of whether or not the treaties create individual rights to consular notification, the
appropriate remedies do not include suppression of evidence or dismissal of the
indictment.‖); Conde v. State, 860 So.2d 930, 953 (Fla. 2003) (same); State v.
Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d 38, 45 (Iowa 2003) (same).
8
See, e.g., Mora, 524 F.3d at 192 (considering an Article 36 violation
under the VCCR itself as well as under the Alien Tort Statute and § 1983).
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however, with mixed results.9 The majority of courts have found
that Article 36 does not confer any judicially enforceable rights on
private parties. 10 Techniques of traditional treaty interpretation also
support the idea that the VCCR does not confer individual rights.11
Yet, legal scholars protest such a conclusion—primarily on the
basis of ensuring international reciprocity and reputation. 12 The
courts should not, however, find individual rights—where they do
not exist—simply to appease the international community. 13
Most scholars who argue in favor of individual rights assume
that some judicial remedy will then be appropriate to address the
violation of Article 36. 14 However, no existing judicial remedy can
9

Compare Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 829 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding
that Article 36 does not confer ―enforceable individual rights‖), with Jogi v.
Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 834 (7th Cir. 2007) (finding that Article 36 does confer
individual rights on foreign nationals).
10
E.g., Gandara, 528 F.3d at 829; Mora, 524 F.3d at 186–87; Cornejo v.
County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007).
11
Steven G. Stransky, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon: A Missed Opportunity
in Treaty Interpretation, 20 ST. THOMAS L. REV. 25, 67 (2007) (―The VCCR‘s
text, the Executive Branch‘s interpretation, the travaux preparatoires, the
VCCR‘s ratification process, and other states‘ domestic implementation all
exemplify the fact that foreign nationals cannot use Article 36 as an avenue for
judicial relief in American courts.‖).
12
See, e.g., Michael J. Larson, Calling All Consuls: U.S. Supreme Court
Divergence from the International Court of Justice and the Shortcomings of
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 22 EMORY INT‘L L. REV. 317, 331 (2008) (―[I]n a
world with increasing numbers of Americans abroad, it would be beneficial for
U.S. citizens arrested in foreign countries for the Supreme Court to set a
standard of granting judicially enforceable individual rights under the
[VCCR].‖); Sarah M. Ray, Domesticating International Obligations: How to
Ensure U.S. Compliance with the Vienna Convention of Consular Relations, 91
CAL. L. REV. 1729, 1769 (2003).
13
See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 (2008) (―A treaty is . . .
‗primarily a compact between independent nations‘ . . . . It ordinarily ‗depends
for the enforcement of its provision on the interest and the honor of the
governments which are parties to it . . . . It is obvious that with all this the
judicial courts have nothing to do and can give no redress.‘‖) (quoting Head
Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 598 (1884) (internal citations omitted)).
14
See, e.g., Larson, supra note 12, at 343 (arguing that Article 36 violations
are on par with constitutional violations and as such, ―similar remedies, such as
the suppression of evidence and the granting of a new trial, ought to be
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cure a VCCR violation.15 The United States Supreme Court and
most state supreme courts have correctly ruled against suppression
of evidence as an appropriate remedy. 16 Civil remedies for a
violation of rights under federal law also fail to redress violations
of the VCCR.17 First, courts that have confronted this question
have found that neither the VCCR itself, nor the Alien Tort Statute,
can justify a remedy. 18 Second, claims under section 1983 (or
similarly drawn state statutes) fail by reason of qualified immunity
for state actors or as collateral attacks on the foreign nationals‘
criminal convictions.19 Therefore, no judicial remedy adequately
addresses VCCR violations.
While some scholars argue that a judicial remedy is the only
way to ensure domestic compliance with Article 36, 20 this is
implemented depending on the degree of the treaty violation‖); Marshall J. Ray,
The Right to Consul and the Right to Counsel: A Critical Re-examining of State
v. Martinez-Rodriguez, 37 N.M. L. REV. 701, 728–30 (2008) (arguing in favor
of suppression of evidence or jury instructions as appropriate remedies for
VCCR violation).
15
See discussion infra Part II.B.
16
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 349 (2006); see also, e.g.,
People v. Martinez, 867 N.E.2d 24, 31, 32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (refusing to apply
the exclusionary rule to VCCR violations); State v. Buenaventura, 660 N.W.2d
38, 45 (Iowa 2003) (―[T]he exclusionary rule simply does not apply to evidence
obtained in violation of Article 36.‖).
17
See discussion infra Part II.B.2.
18
E.g., Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 192 (2d Cir. 2008) (finding no
available civil remedy under the VCCR itself because the treaty makes no
mention of such a remedy, and no available remedy under the Alien Tort Statute
because there is no cognizable tort of VCCR violation).
19
See discussion infra Part II.B.2. The courts that have dealt with section
1983 claims have not yet reached the question of actual remedy because most
courts have not found individually enforceable rights; therefore, there has been
no decision about the applicability of qualified immunity in VCCR violation
cases. However, the Seventh Circuit in Jogi v. Voges—which found enforceable
rights—noted that ―the issue of qualified immunity . . . will [inevitably] arise.‖
480 F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 2007).
20
E.g., Joshua E. Carpenter, Medellin v. Dretke and the United States’
Myopic Failure to Guarantee the “Full Effect” of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, 17 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 515, 517 (2007) (―[A]
Supreme Court precedent clarifying [individually enforceable rights] is the only
way to ensure the United States‘ adherence to VCCR Article 36(2).‖).
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simply not the case and courts should not impose improper and
inadequate remedies based on this assumption. This Note argues
that the VCCR confers no individually enforceable right on foreign
nationals and that even assuming arguendo that some enforceable
right does exist, available judicial remedies are either improper or
inadequate avenues to addressing VCCR violations. 21 Instead,
enforcement of the VCCR is better served through alternative
means. Part I of this Note discusses the background of the VCCR.
Part II first addresses the debate on the existence of individual
rights in Article 36, ultimately concluding that no such right exists.
Part II goes on to argue that in either case, no judicial remedy will
satisfactorily address violations of the VCCR. Part III analyzes the
current policies in place for VCCR compliance and possible
methods of increasing compliance in individual states without
judicial remedies. In conclusion, Part III offers a suggestion for
how to ensure the United States‘ compliance with Article 36
without relying on judicial remedies.
I. VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
A. Brief History and Basic Structure
The VCCR is a multilateral treaty that was designed to unify
(and subsequently codify) the practices of consular relations,
which prior to the United Nations Conference varied greatly with
―bilateral agreements and national laws‖ governing. 22
Representatives from more than eighty-five countries gathered on
March 4, 1963, to begin negotiations of an international treaty to
regulate all manner of consular relations. 23 The Conference started
with a draft developed over eight years by the International Law
Commission.24 After several weeks of tedious discussion and
negotiation, the Conference ended with a seventy-nine-article
treaty and two Optional Protocols—one of which concerned the
21

See discussion infra Part II.
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 1st plen.
mtg. at 6, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR1 (Mar. 4, 1963).
23
Id. at 5.
24
Id. at 7.
22
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resolution of disputes under the VCCR.25
With the purpose of ―maintain[ing] international peace and
security, and [promoting] friendly relations among nations,‖ 26 the
United States and its fellow delegations unanimously adopted the
VCCR at the conclusion of the United Nations Conference in April
1963.27 Since that time, the total number of member states has
increased to over 170 countries. 28 Provisions of the VCCR address
the spectrum of consular relations including ―consular functions;
facilities, privileges and immunities of consular personnel; and
communications with nationals of the sending state.‖29 Several
25

The Optional Protocol—initially signed by the United States and thirtyseven other member states—confers jurisdiction over disputes arising out of the
VCCR on the International Court of Justice (―ICJ‖). U.N. Conference on
Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. II, Optional protocol concerning the
compulsory settlement of disputes at 190–92, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/15 (Apr.
24, 1963). As of March 7, 2005, the United States is no longer a party to the
Optional Protocol, nor bound by decisions of the ICJ. United Nations Treaty
Collection, Status of Multilateral Treaties Deposited with the Secretary-General
at n.1 (2008), available at http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ParticipationStatus.aspx
(follow ―Chapter III‖ hyperlink; then follow ―8. Optional Protocol to the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes‖ hyperlink) (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). The withdrawal was made in
response to an unfavorable decision in the Avena case, discussed infra notes 82–
83 and accompanying text, to ―[protect] against future International Court of
Justice judgments that might similarly interfere in ways [the U.S.] did not
anticipate when [it] joined the optional protocol.‖ Adam Liptak, U.S. Says It Has
Withdrawn From World Judicial Body, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 2005, at A16
(quoting Darla Jordan, State Department spokeswoman).
26
VCCR, supra note 1, preamble.
27
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 22d
plen. mtg. at 41, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.1 (Apr. 22, 1963). Some delegations
approved the final act with reservations, id. at 42–54, with several countries
expressing reservations specifically with Article 36. Id. at 42, 45, 47–48, 51–52.
28
United Nations Treaty Collection, supra note 25 (follow ―Chapter III‖
hyperlink; then follow ―6. Vienna Convention on Consular Relations‖
hyperlink).
29
Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 828 (7th Cir. 2007). More specifically, the
VCCR is divided into five chapters: 1) Consular Relations in General, 2)
Facilities, Privileges and Immunities Relating to Consular Posts, Career
Consular Officers and other Members of a Consular Post, 3) Regime Relating to
Honorary Consular Officers and Consular Posts Headed by Such Officers, 4)
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delegates expressed the sentiment that of all these provisions,
―Article 36 was one of the most important in the whole draft.‖30
B. The Communications Provision
Article 36—the communications provision—deals in part with
notification of local consulates when a foreign national is arrested
or detained. 31 With the presumption that consulates should be
given access to arrested or detained nationals, the provision asserts:
1. With a view to facilitating the exercise of consular
functions relating to nationals of the sending State:
(a) consular officers shall be free to communicate with
nationals of the sending State and to have access to
them. Nationals of the sending State shall have the
same freedom with respect to communication with and
access to consular officers of the sending State;
(b) if he so requests, the competent authorities of the
receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular
post of the sending State if, within its consular district,
a national of that State is arrested or committed to
prison or to custody pending trial or is detained in any
other manner. Any communication addressed to the
consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody
or detention shall also be forwarded by the said
authorities without delay. The said authorities shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights
under this sub-paragraph;
(c) consular officers shall have the right to visit a
national of the sending State who is in prison, custody
General Provisions, and 5) Final Provisions. VCCR, supra note 1.
30
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 2d
Comm., 17th mtg. at 2, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 1963)
(comments by a French delegate); see also id. at 17 (comments by a Tunisian
delegate) (stating that ―[Article 36] paragraph 1(b) was one of the most
important in the draft‖); id. at 13 (comments by a Greek delegate) (expressing
the ―very great importance‖ attached to Article 36 given its potential impact on
the future of human rights).
31
See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36.
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or detention, to converse and correspond with him and
to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also
have the right to visit any national of the sending State
who is in prison, custody or detention in their district in
pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular
officers shall refrain from taking action on behalf of a
national who is in prison, custody or detention if he
expressly opposes such action.
2. The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall
be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of
the receiving State, subject to the proviso, however, that the
said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be given
to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this
Article are intended.32
The International Law Committee, which originally proposed
Article 36, designed this provision to cover any situation where a
foreign national may be detained—including pre- and postcriminal conviction, ―quarantine, [and] detention in a mental
institution.‖33 As originally drafted, paragraphs 1 and 2 focused
solely on consular officials; there was no mention of the detained
foreign national. 34 It is clear from discussions at the Conference,
however, that the Article was meant to facilitate the ability of
consular officials to protect their citizens traveling abroad.35 The
final draft reflected a compromise between an attempt to make
compliance feasible for receiving states and to maintain the rights
of the sending state in protecting its citizens abroad.36
32

Id.
U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. II,
Annexes—Draft articles on consular relations adopted by the International Law
Commission at its thirteenth session at art. 36 commentary (4)(c), U.N. Doc.
A/CONF.25/6 (1963).
34
Id. at 24.
35
See generally U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record,
Vol. I, 2d Comm., 17th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 1963)
(discussion of proposed amendments to paragraph 1(b)).
36
See U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 11th
plen. mtg. at 16, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.11 (Apr. 17, 1963) (comments by
the Vietnamese delegate) (―[I]t was a matter of reconciling the interests of two
33
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While Article 36 primarily addresses the receiving states‘
obligations to consular officials, section (1)(b) directs that the
authorities of the receiving state ―shall inform the person
concerned without delay of his rights . . . .‖37 The meaning of this
phrase is the source of debate, not only in U.S. courts but for other
nations and the ICJ as well. 38 Ever since the Court‘s passing
comment in Breard v. Greene concerning the possibility of
individual rights under Article 36, 39 a flurry of criminal and civil
challenges have been brought by foreign nationals in U.S. courts,40
forcing lower courts to grapple with questions about the
communications provision that the Supreme Court refuses to
answer.41 Unless the Supreme Court rules definitively that no
individual rights exist under the VCCR, the flurry of litigation
threatens to continue or possibly become a flood of litigation. In
the meantime, legal scholars and lower courts will continue to
debate what rights, if any, foreign nationals have, what actions are
appropriate to remedy violations of those rights, and how to
enforce compliance in the United States with the communications
provision.

equal sovereign States — the sending State and the receiving State — with
respect for the rights of the detained person.‖).
37
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b).
38
See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 15, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2005 WL 3598178
(citing art. 36(1)(b) in arguing that the plain text of the VCCR confers an
individually enforceable right); LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 492–
93 (June 27) (citing Germany‘s argument that the German defendants had
individual rights under Article 36 given the reference to ―rights‖ in the last
sentence of paragraph 1(b) ―of the person concerned‖).
39
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
40
See, e.g., Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 831–32 (7th Cir. 2007); United
States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d Cir. 2001); Rahmani v. State, 898
So. 2d 132, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005); People v. Salgado, 852 N.E.2d 266,
276–77 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006); Gomez v. Commonwealth, 152 S.W.3d 238, 242
(Ky. Ct. App. 2004); People v. Oritz, 795 N.Y.S.2d 182, 183 (N.Y. App. Div.
2005).
41
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006) (assuming,
without deciding, that Article 36 conferred an individual right).
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II.THE GREAT VCCR DEBATE
A. Right or No Right?
Although the Supreme Court has refused to explicitly accept or
reject the existence of individual rights under Article 36 of the
VCCR, other entities have not been so reluctant to address the
issue.42 Lower courts, the Executive Branch, the ICJ and legal
scholars have all taken definitive positions one way or the other
employing a variety of approaches. 43
1. Approach by Domestic Courts
Although the analysis employed by each court differs in some
respect, the majority of domestic courts have ruled against the
establishment of privately enforceable rights in Article 36. 44 In
determining whether the VCCR conferred individual rights on
foreign nationals, courts have examined both the text of and
context around the VCCR.45 As noted by the Ninth Circuit
majority in Cornejo v. City of San Diego, ―Article 36 textually uses
the word ‗rights‘ in reference to a detainee‘s being informed that
he can . . . have his consular post advised of his detention and have
42

Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 187 (2d Cir. 2008) (noting sister
circuits that have addressed and answered the question of individual rights under
the VCCR).
43
E.g., Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 831 (11th Cir. 2008) (finding no
individual right to sue under the VCCR); see United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56,
63–64 (1st Cir. 2000) (―The [VCCR] . . . establish[es] state-to-state rights and
obligations . . . . [It does] not . . . establish[] the rights of individuals. The right
of an individual to communicate with his consular official is derivative of the
sending state‘s right to extend consular protection to its nationals when consular
relations exist . . . .‖ (quoting the State Department‘s ―Answers to the Questions
Posed by the First Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li‖)); LaGrand, 2001
I.C.J. at 494 (holding that the VCCR does confer individual rights on foreign
nationals); Stransky, supra note 11, at 67–68 (arguing that no individual rights
exist in the VCCR).
44
E.g., Gandara, 528 F.3d at 831; Mora, 524 F.3d at 192; Cornejo v.
County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 855 (9th Cir. 2007).
45
Mora, 524 F.3d at 193–94.
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communications forwarded to it.‖46 On its face, then, the VCCR
seems to confer individual rights.47 However, when interpreted in
the context of the introductory language of Article 36 and the
preamble of the VCCR, this textual reference is less clear. 48 The
introductory language of Article 36(1) stipulates that it is related
specifically to ―facilitating the exercise of consular functions.‖ 49
The preamble reinforces this goal, stating that ―the purpose of such
privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf
of their respective States.‖50 The majority of courts have found
these provisions to militate against inferring individual rights under
Article 36.51 However, in Jogi v. Voges, the Seventh Circuit found
the language of Article 36 so clear that it was unnecessary to use
the preamble to interpret its meaning. 52 Article 36 specifically
provides that authorities must ―inform the [foreign national]
concerned without delay of his rights.‖53 In light of this language,
Seventh Circuit Judge Wood accused the other circuits of
―creat[ing] ambiguity . . . where none exist[ed].‖54
The disagreement over ambiguity, however, stems less from
the plain language of Article 36, but primarily from a well-founded
principle of treaty interpretation employed by most domestic
courts—and ignored by the Seventh Circuit in Jogi—that there is a
46

Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 859.
See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b) (―[A]uthorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.‖).
48
Mora, 524 F.3d at 195–96.
49
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1).
50
VCCR, supra note 1, preamble.
51
Mora, 524 F.3d at 195; see also Gandara v. Bennett, 528 F.3d 823, 827
(11th Cir. 2008) (finding that the preamble of the VCCR weighed against
Article 36 containing individually enforceable rights); Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 859
(same). But see Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822, 833–34 (7th Cir. 2007) (stating that
the preamble has no bearing on the enforcement of rights within the VCCR
because it was primarily a statement of general purpose for the entire VCCR,
and that a preamble is only a useful interpretive tool when ambiguity exists as is
not the case in Article 36).
52
480 F.3d at 833.
53
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(1)(b) (emphasis added).
54
Jogi, 480 F.3d at 834.
47
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―presumption against inferring [enforceable individual] rights from
international treaties.‖ 55 Given this presumption, any ambiguity or
contradiction within the provisions of the treaty tips the scale
against finding an enforceable right.56 As enunciated by the Sixth
Circuit, ―[a]bsent express language in a treaty providing for
particular judicial remedies, the federal courts will not vindicate
private rights unless a treaty creates fundamental rights on a par
with those protected by the Constitution.‖ 57 State courts have
generally followed suit.58
Congress‘ intent is another aspect of treaty interpretation that
courts consider.59 The Ninth Circuit in Cornejo stated that the
appropriate question to ask was ―whether, Congress, by ratifying
the VCCR, intended to create private rights and remedies
enforceable in American courts . . . .‖60 It seems counterintuitive
55

Gandara, 528 F.3d at 828 (internal quotations omitted); see also
Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations Law of the United States
§ 907 cmt. a (1987) (―International agreements, even those directly benefiting
private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a private
cause of action in domestic courts.‖); accord Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct.
1346, 1357 n.3 (2008). But see Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 378
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (asserting that the presumption against
individually enforceable rights has no basis in any specific Supreme Court case).
56
See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001)
(using the presumption against implying personal rights in international treaties
to find that ―Article 36 rights belong to the party states‖ despite contradictory
language in Article 36 and the Preamble).
57
Id. at 390; see also United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157, 165 (2d
Cir. 2001) (holding that the VCCR does ―not create any ‗fundamental rights‘ for
a foreign national‖).
58
See Maharaj v. State, 778 So. 2d 944, 959 (Fla. 2000) (holding that
foreign nationals do not have standing to bring an action under the VCCR
because ―treaties are between countries, not citizens‖); State v. Banda, 639
S.E.2d 36, 43 (S.C. 2006) (―[I]nternational treaties do not create rights
equivalent to constitutional rights . . . .‖).
59
E.g., Cornejo v. County of San Diego, 504 F.3d 853, 861–62 (9th Cir.
2007).
60
Id. This was one of several civil cases under section 1983 so the court
analyzed the issue of enforceable rights within the context of private causes of
action. Id. at 856. The Supreme Court enunciated the rule for determining
whether a statute allowed for private individuals a cause of action under section
1983 or similar statutes in Gonzaga University v. Doe. 536 U.S. 273, 283
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that in ratifying the VCCR the Senate intended to confer rights on
individuals because consular relations are peculiarly ―State-toState.‖61 Indeed, the courts have placed significant weight on the
Senate Report concerning the VCCR which stated that ―[t]he
[VCCR did] not change or affect present U.S. laws or practice.‖62
Presumably, then, in the Senate‘s view, the VCCR also did not
create any additional rights for foreign nationals under U.S. law.63
The dissent in Cornejo argued that the majority in that case—
and courts using similar analysis—was asking the wrong
question. 64 Judge Nelson contended that the appropriate question is
not Congress‘ intent in passing the VCCR, but whether the
―ratifying Congress of the [VCCR] had an intent to confer
individual rights in Article 36(1)(b).‖65
Even if this is the correct question, it seems unlikely that it
would change the decision of the majority of courts. First, the
intent of the ratifying Congress is difficult to parse. 66 Some
representatives spoke of ―rights‖ during the discussion of Article
36,67 but most of the discussion focused on the ability of receiving
(2002). To make this determination the Court looks for clear, unambiguous
intent by the language or structure of the statute. Id. at 282–83. Treaties undergo
a similar analysis, but must first pass the threshold question of whether or not
they are self-executing. Cornejo, 504 F. 3d at 856.
61
Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 861.
62
United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 65 (1st Cir. 2000) (quoting Sen. Doc.
Exec. E, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969)).
63
See id. at 64–65 (using the emphasis in Senate reports on the Preamble‘s
assertion that the VCCR does not benefit individuals and the importance of
maintaining the status quo expressed in Senate Committee Reports to support
finding no individual rights conferred by Article 36).
64
Cornejo, 504 F.3d at 864 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
65
Id.
66
Compare U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol.
I, 2d Comm., 17th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15,
1963) (comments by the Korean delegate) (noting the ―indispensable rights‖ of
the foreign national), with U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official
Record, Vol. I, 20th plen. mtg. at 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.20 (Apr. 20,
1963) (comments by the Egyptian delegate) (focusing on the burden of receiving
States).
67
E.g., U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 2d
Comm., 17th mtg. at 11, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.17 (Mar. 15, 1963)
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States to implement the requirements of Article 36. 68 That the
delegates considered the interests of individuals does not
necessarily lead to the inference that they also meant to confer
judicially enforceable rights on individuals. 69 In light of such
ambiguity, domestic courts will rely on the presumption against
individual rights.70 Second, the VCCR failed to mention any way
in which individuals could seek redress. 71 Even the Optional
Protocol, which was ―designed to implement the terms of the
[VCCR],‖ made no mention of private actions by detained
individuals. 72 Had the signatories contemplated the creation of
individually enforceable rights, it would follow that some mention
of an individual remedy would be included, at the very least, in the

(comments by the Korean delegate) (―[R]eceiving State‘s obligation under
paragraph 1 (b) was extremely important, because it related to one of the
fundamental and indispensable rights of the individual.‖); U.N. Conference on
Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I, 2d Comm., 16th mtg. at 39, U.N.
Doc. A/CONF.25/C.2/SR.16 (Mar. 15, 1963) (comments by the United States
delegate) (―The object of the amendment was to protect the rights of the national
concerned . . . . [H]e might not like his consulate to be informed. To avoid such
situations the United States proposed the words ‗at the request of a
national . . . .‘‖).
68
E.g., U.N. Conference on Consular Relations Official Record, Vol. I,
20th plen. mtg. at 62, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.25/SR.20 (Apr. 20, 1963) (comments
by the Egyptian delegate) (noting that the revision of the consular notification
provision providing that notification occur at the foreign national‘s request was
meant ―to lessen the burden on the authorities of receiving States, especially
those which had large numbers of resident aliens or which receive many tourists
and visitors‖).
69
See Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting
Respondents at 19 n.4, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos.
05-51, 04-10566), 2006 WL 271823 (―The ‗rights‘ to which the American
delegate referred were not rights created by treaty, but ‗rights‘ that existed
wholly independent of the draft convention, i.e., ‗the freedom of action of the
detained persons who might not wish their consulate to be informed,‘ such as
those seeking asylum.‖) (citing 1 U.N. Official Records 38 (para.21)).
70
See supra notes 55–56 and accompanying text.
71
Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 194 (2d Cir. 2008).
72
Id. at 197.

LEE_6-5-09

6/6/2009 12:59 PM

HOW TO ENSURE VCCR COMPLIANCE

623

Optional Protocol. 73 Again, this weighs against finding an
individually enforceable right.
2. Approach by the Executive Branch
Because treaties are negotiated and enforced by the Executive
Branch, the Executive Branch‘s interpretation of what is and is not
created under a treaty should be given ―respectful consideration,‖
if not a greater level of deference. 74 In fact, the Supreme Court
generally affords ―great weight‖ to ―the meaning attributed to
treaty provisions by the Government agencies charged with their
negotiation and enforcement.‖75 The State Department has long
taken the position that the VCCR does not confer any individual
rights.76 When raising consular notification violations in other
countries, the United States pursues diplomatic channels or
addresses the arresting officials directly, but does not raise any
arguments for a judicially enforceable right of the American
citizen traveling abroad in the offending country‘s courts.77 When
73

See id. (noting the absence of private actions by detained individuals as
support for the finding that no individual enforceable rights are conferred by
Article 36).
74
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court held that ―respectful
consideration‖ was owed to any ruling of the ICJ. 548 U.S. 331, 356 (2006). At
a minimum, the U.S. Executive Branch deserves at least the amount of
deference owed an international judicial body. See El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd v.
Tsui Yuan Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 168 (1999) (―Respect is ordinarily due the
reasonable views of the Executive Branch concerning the meaning of an
international treaty.‖).
75
United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 369 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo
Shoji America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 184 (1982)); see also Kolovrat
v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 187, 194 (1961).
76
See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 63–64 (1st Cir. 2000) (―The
[VCCR] . . . establish[es] state-to-state rights and obligations . . . . [It does]
not . . . establish[] the rights of individuals. The right of an individual to
communicate with his consular official is derivative of the sending state‘s right
to extend consular protection to its nationals when consular relations exist . . . .‖
(quoting the State Department‘s ―Answers to the Questions Posed by the First
Circuit in United States v. Nai Fook Li‖)).
77
See Brief for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 25,
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VCCR violations have come to the Supreme Court, the Executive
Branch has repeatedly submitted amicus briefs reiterating its
position against the existence of individual rights in the VCCR. 78
Similarly, when presenting its case to the ICJ, the United States
has rejected the idea that the VCCR created any judicially
enforceable rights.79 The United States‘ position in the ICJ has
always been that the rights in the VCCR are purely state-to-state.80
Further evidence of the Executive Branch‘s construction of the
VCCR is found in the recent withdrawal from the Optional
Protocol.81 The withdrawal came shortly after an ICJ ruling against
the United States.82 Some scholars have criticized the move as
―sore-loser behavior;‖83 however, it reflects the view of the
Executive Branch that when the United States entered the VCCR
and Optional Protocol, it was under the belief that U.S. law
incurred no major changes. 84 As the ICJ ruled in ways that
undermined this belief, the Executive Branch sought to prevent
future rulings that would substantially change U.S. law. 85 The
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (Nos. 05-51, 04-10566),
2006 WL 271823.
78
See id. (―The Executive Branch has never interpreted the [VCCR] to give
a foreign national a judicially enforceable right . . . . ―); see also Brief for the
U.S. as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 22–23, Medellin v. Dretke,
544 U.S. 660 (2005) (No. 04-5928), 2005 WL 504490.
79
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 493–94 (June 27).
80
Id. at 494 (―[R]ights of consular notification and access under the Vienna
Convention are rights of States, not of individuals, even though these rights may
benefit individuals by permitting States to offer them consular assistance.‖).
81
See supra note 25.
82
The International Court of Justice found that the United States breached
its VCCR obligations by not informing fifty-one Mexican nationals of their right
to consular notification upon arrest and found that the ―appropriate reparation‖
was ―review and reconsideration of the convictions and sentences‖ of the
aforementioned Mexican nationals. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72 (March 31).
83
Liptak, supra note 25 (quoting Peter J. Spiro, law professor at the
University of Georgia).
84
See supra note 76.
85
Liptak, supra note 25 (stating that the decision to withdraw was made to
―protect[] against future International Court of Justice judgments that might
similarly interfere in ways [the U.S.] did not anticipate when [it] joined the
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position of the Executive Branch weighs heavily against finding
individual rights in the VCCR.
3. Approach the Supreme Court Should Take
The Court will certainly give ―respectful consideration‖ to the
ICJ rulings,86 which found that the VCCR conferred an
individually enforceable right on foreign nationals. 87 However,
U.S. courts interpret treaties under U.S. law. 88 This is especially
true of Article 36, which specifically states that ―[t]he rights
referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall be exercised in
conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving State.‖89
If under U.S. law Article 36, as constructed and interpreted,
confers no individual right, the Court must recognize this despite
the ICJ interpretation.90 Most who argue in favor of individual
rights, however, place great weight on the proviso of Article 36,
paragraph 2—that ―full effect‖ be given to the VCCR. 91 This
position assumes that full effect cannot be given without a finding
of individual rights in Article 36. 92 However, the U.S. is perfectly
capable of giving full effect to the VCCR without ascribing
optional protocol‖) (quoting State Department spokeswoman).
86
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 355 (2006).
87
LaGrand (F.R.G. v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 466, 494 (June 27) (―Based on the
text of these provisions, the Court concludes that Article 36, paragraph 1, creates
individual rights . . . .‖).
88
See Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 193 (2d Cir. 2008) (―Whether a
treaty creates a right in an individual litigant that can be enforced in domestic
proceedings by that litigant is for the court to decide as a matter of treaty
interpretation.‖).
89
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36(2).
90
See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 355 (holding that ICJ interpretations
are entitled to ―respectful consideration‖ but are not binding on domestic
courts).
91
E.g., Reply Brief for Petitioner Moises Sanchez-Llamas at 12, SanchezLlamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (No. 04-10566), 2006 WL 598180;
Carpenter, supra note 20, at 516–17.
92
See, e.g., Carpenter, supra note 20, at 517 (arguing that ―a Supreme
Court precedent . . . is the only way to ensure the United States‘ adherence to
VCCR Article 36(2)‖); Ray, supra note 12, at 1769.
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judicially enforceable rights to Article 36. 93 As such, the Supreme
Court can and should find that the VCCR confers no individual
rights.94
B. No Remedy Regardless
Even if the Supreme Court found that the VCCR conferred
individual rights on foreign nationals, its prior opinions and the
previous opinions of many state courts and courts of appeals
preclude any meaningful remedy from curing the violation. 95
Oftentimes where the rights of defendants in a criminal case are
concerned, the purpose of a remedy is not solely curing the
violation, but also deterring abhorrent police behavior. 96 The
VCCR does not include any specific remedial measures; therefore,
remedies for such violations must be found in U.S. domestic law.97
The remedies available in criminal prosecutions are inappropriate
under U.S. law.98 Furthermore, to the extent that civil remedies are
available, they, too, will prove inadequate in providing specific
relief and/or deterrence.99
1. Criminal Challenges
In a criminal prosecution, one of two judicial remedies is
typically available to cure any prejudice that results from improper
93

See discussion infra Part III.B.
Accord Stransky, supra note 11, at 67–68 (using traditional treaty
interpretive techniques to arrive at the same conclusion as the majority of circuit
courts that no individual rights exist under the VCCR).
95
E.g., Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350 (foreclosing the suppression of
evidence as a remedy used by federal courts).
96
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 597–98 (2006) (suggesting that
civil suits may act as a deterrent to police conduct that cannot be addressed
through suppression of evidence); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 916
(1984) (―[T]he the exclusionary rule is designed to deter police
misconduct . . . .‖).
97
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 343 (pointing out that ―the implementation
of Article 36 [is left] to domestic law‖).
98
See infra Part II.B.1.
99
See infra Part II.B.2.
94
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police conduct: 1) suppression of evidence (―exclusionary rule‖)
and 2) dismissal of indictment (or, if made post-conviction,
overturning conviction).100 Both remedies carry great societal
costs,101 but are sometimes necessary to protect individual
rights.102 Therefore, just as the exclusionary rule is a ―last
resort,‖103 so too is dismissal of a charge.104 The same principles
and logic apply to either remedy. 105
The exclusionary rule originated as a ―protect[ion of] specific,
constitutionally protected rights.‖106 Federal courts have
acknowledged the possibility that the rule may extend to certain
statutory rights that carry similar weight.107 Defendants argue that
VCCR violations are on the same level as constitutional violations

100

See United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 61 (1st Cir. 2000) (noting that
these two remedies are available for violations of the Fourth, Fifth and Sixth
Amendments).
101
Most courts speak of the cost-benefit analysis in the context of
suppression of evidence, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524
U.S. 357, 364–65 (1998), but the same reasoning applies to any judicial remedy.
The societal costs to consider are high, particularly the increased ―risk of
releasing dangerous criminals‖ because incriminating evidence is suppressed.
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 595.
102
E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479–80 (1966) (applying the
exclusionary rule to Fifth Amendment violations); Massiah v. United States, 377
U.S. 201, 206 (1964) (Sixth Amendment); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655–56
(1961) (Fourth Amendment).
103
Hudson, 547 U.S. at 591.
104
See United States v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting that
dismissal is a ―more drastic remedy‖ than suppression); Li, 206 F.3d at 61
(asserting that suppression of evidence and the dismissal of an indictment are
reserved for the ―most fundamental of rights‖).
105
When defendants argue for both suppression or dismissal under the
VCCR, the courts typically analyze the remedies contemporaneously. E.g.,
Page, 232 F.3d at 540–41; see also United States v. De La Pava, 268 F.3d 157,
165–66 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing other circuit decisions against suppression in
support of decision against dismissal).
106
Page, 232 F.3d at 540 (citation and quotations omitted).
107
United States v. Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d 882, 886 (9th Cir.
2000) (―[A]n exclusionary remedy may be available for violations of provisions
of law other than the Constitution.‖).
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and thus, the exclusionary rule should apply. 108 Federal courts have
rejected this argument since the Supreme Court‘s suggestion in
Breard that there may be some individual right in the VCCR. 109 As
early as 2000, the Ninth Circuit held that suppression was not a
remedy for VCCR violations.110 Other circuit courts soon
followed.111
In making this determination, many courts have consulted the
State Department for guidance. 112 The State Department reported
that it worked with law enforcement to implement the notification
provision, which the Ninth Circuit noted as undermining the
traditional justification for the exclusionary rule as the ―only
available method of controlling police misconduct.‖113 Almost as
compelling as the State Department‘s own policy were statements
it made regarding treatment of the provision in other countries,
since the treaty itself provided no direction as to what remedies
should be available. 114 The State Department reported that, to its
knowledge, no other country utilized suppression as a remedy for
VCCR violations.115 In fact, the State Department maintained that
108

United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192, 198 (5th Cir. 2001)
(explaining defendant‘s argument that ―consular . . . notification is a
‗fundamental right‘ . . . which merits protection through use of the exclusionary
rule‖).
109
Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199 (refusing to afford consular notification
the same level of protection as Miranda rights). See also De La Pava, 268 F.3d
at 165 (holding that the ―consular notification provision . . . [does] not create
any ‗fundamental rights‘ . . . . [And a]ccordingly . . . is not the basis for a
dismissal‖) (citation omitted).
110
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888.
111
E.g., Page, 232 F.3d at 541; United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st
Cir. 2000).
112
E.g., United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 392 (6th Cir. 2001);
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887; Li, 206 F.3d at 66.
113
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 887–88.
114
Li, 206 F.3d at 66 (noting that statements by Department officials and
other countries‘ practices ―evidence a belief . . . [that VCCR violations] do not
warrant suppression‖); Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d at 393 (citing Li for a similar
proposition).
115
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888 (noting that two countries
explicitly rejected suppression); Li, 206 F.3d at 65 (citing State Department
statement that it knows of no countries who use their criminal justice systems to
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standard practice at the time was an investigation and formal
apology with a promise to increase efforts to prevent future
violations. 116
In its own analysis, the Ninth Circuit also pointed to the lack of
connection between consular
notification and police
117
interrogation. Proponents of the exclusionary rule‘s application
to VCCR violations often analogize the rights of the VCCR to
Miranda rights.118 As the court noted, however, consular
notification, as described in the treaty, does not guarantee anything
more than the notification of the foreign national‘s consulate.119
The consulate is not compelled to assist by providing counsel or
resources,120 nor are the police compelled to ―cease interrogation
once the right is invoked.‖121 Therefore, the exclusionary rule
―does not further the treaty‘s purposes.‖ 122 By the end of 2001,
relying on the same or very similar reasoning, half of the Federal
Courts of Appeals found that the exclusionary rule was an
inappropriate remedy for Article 36 violations. 123
rectify VCCR violations).
116
Li, 206 F.3d at 65.
117
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886.
118
Id. at 887 (reiterating defendant‘s argument that Article 36 protections
are analogous to Miranda rights); United States v. Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192,
198 (5th Cir. 2001) (reiterating a similar argument by defendant); see also,
Elizabeth Samson, Revisiting Miranda After Avena: The Implications of Mexico
v. United States of America for the Implementation of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations in the United States, 29 FORDHAM INT‘L L.J. 1068, 1123–24
(2006) (equating Miranda rights with the right to consular notification).
119
See Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886.
120
Article 36 deals solely with notification by the receiving state. See
VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36. There is no language that suggests any duties that
the consulate then has to its national. See id.
121
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 886.
122
Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199.
123
E.g., United States v. Li, 206 F.3d 56, 66 (1st Cir. 2000); United States
v. Page, 232 F.3d 536, 540–41 (6th Cir. 2000); Jiminez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 199;
Lombera-Camorlinga, 206 F.3d at 888; United States v. Chaparro-Alcantara,
226 F.3d 616, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2000); United States v. Cordoba-Mosquera, 212
F.3d 1194, 1195–96 (11th Cir. 2000); see also United States v. De La Pava, 268
F.3d 157, 164–65 (2d Cir. 2001) (refusing to dismiss an indictment based on the
VCCR).
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The Supreme Court finally took up the issue in SanchezLlamas v. Oregon in 2006.124 By assuming, without finding, that
the VCCR conferred individual rights, the Court rejected SanchezLlamas‘ claim that his statements to the police should have been
suppressed because he was never informed of his right to consular
notification. 125 The Court‘s approach in rejecting this argument
was two-fold: 1) the Court held that it could not require
suppression as a rule for violations of the VCCR by state courts
applying state criminal law and 2) even if the Court could impose
suppression on the states, it did not feel suppression was the proper
remedy. 126
On the premise that the Court generally does ―not hold []
supervisory power over the courts of the several States‖127 and
―may intervene only to correct wrongs of constitutional
dimension,‖128 the Court found that it could only intervene in
Sanchez-Llamas (or any state criminal case) if the VCCR provided
a specific judicial remedy. 129 It is clear from the text of the VCCR,
and specifically Article 36, that no such remedy exists in the
VCCR itself. 130 As such, the Court concluded that it could not
require suppression because to do so would ―enlarg[e] the
obligations of the United States under the [VCCR].‖131
The Court, however, continued its examination of the issue of
suppression—presumably to establish accord with the findings of
the circuit courts.132 The Court reiterated that ―there is . . . little
connection between an Article 36 violation and evidence or
statements obtained by police.‖133 In other words, there is no
124

Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331, 337 (2006).
Id.
126
Id.
127
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000).
128
Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 221 (1982).
129
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346.
130
See generally VCCR, supra note 1.
131
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 346.
132
See id.; see also id. at 350 (noting that foreign nationals are afforded the
same Due Process protections as citizens and that these protections ―safeguard
the same interests . . . [as] Article 36‖).
133
Id. at 349.
125
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prejudice inflicted on a foreign national whose Article 36 rights are
violated that must be cured by suppressing evidence.134
Furthermore, deterrence is ill-served by suppressing evidence
based on VCCR violations. 135 As the Court eloquently noted, ―the
failure to inform a defendant of his Article 36 rights is unlikely,
with any frequency, to produce unreliable confessions . . . .
[P]olice win little, if any, practical advantage from violating
Article 36. Suppression would be a vastly disproportionate remedy
for an Article 36 violation.‖ 136 Accordingly, the decision of the
Supreme Court basically precludes suppression for VCCR
violations in the federal system. 137
Even after Sanchez-Llamas, states may choose suppression as a
remedy for Article 36 violations, 138 but this course of action seems
unlikely. Prior to Sanchez-Llamas—with one exception139—state
courts confronted with the issue of suppression for VCCR
violations concluded that suppression was not a suitable remedy

134

See id.
See id.
136
Id. The Court is referring to the cost-benefit analysis articulated in other
cases that employ the exclusionary rule. See, e.g., Pennsylvania Bd. of Prob. &
Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 357–58 (1998). Although the Court does not fully
articulate its reasoning, implicit in this statement is consideration of what benefit
protecting these interests has on society, and what costs protecting these
interests has on society. See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006)
(―[T]he value of deterrence depends upon the strength of the incentive to
commit the forbidden act.‖).
137
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 350 (―[N]either the [VCCR] itself nor our
precedents applying the exclusionary rule support suppression of SanchezLlamas‘ statements to police.‖).
138
The Supreme Court‘s decision is binding on state courts only insofar as
its interpretation that the VCCR itself does not require suppression because the
Court declined to use its supervisory power to render this decision. See id. at
346. Individual state courts may incorporate ―international law through their
independent common lawmaking powers.‖ Julian G. Ku, The State of New York
Does Exist: How the States Control Compliance with International Law, 82
N.C. L. REV. 457, 476 (2004).
139
State v. Reyes, 740 A.2d 7, 14 (Del. Super. Ct. 1999), overruled as
recognized by State v. Vasquez, No. CR.A.98-01-0317-R2, 2001 WL 755930, at
*1 (Del. Super. Ct. May 23, 2001) (unpublished opinion).
135
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regardless of whether or not there was an individual right. 140 The
decision in Sanchez-Llamas does nothing to persuade state courts
that their initial analyses on this issue were wrong. 141 Indeed, postSanchez-Llamas, state courts continue to deny suppression of
evidence for VCCR violations.142 State court judges may even
―feel bound by the application of a federal treaty by the federal
courts.‖143 Many states have their own versions of the exclusionary
rule that is applied under state law, but even with these rules,
VCCR challenges fail the suppression test.144 Therefore, even
though the Supreme Court‘s decision was not binding on state
140

E.g., People v. Corona, 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 210, 213 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001)
(holding that suppression is not an available remedy for Article 36 violations);
Conde v. State, 860 So. 2d 930, 953 (Fla. 2003) (holding that ―suppression . . . is
not an appropriate remedy . . . for an [A]rticle 36‖ violation); State v. Quintero,
No. M2003-02311-CCA-R3-CD, 2005 WL 941004, at *10 (Tenn. Crim. App.
Apr. 22, 2005) (declining to apply the exclusionary rule to an Article 36
violation); Bell v. Commonwealth, 563 S.E.2d 695, 707 (Va. 2002) (same as
Conde).
141
The reasons given by the Supreme Court to find that violation of the
VCCR does not warrant suppression as a remedy are factors that state courts
will also consider. Compare Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 347–50 (discussion of
suppression as a remedy), with Bell, 563 S.E.2d at 707 (brief discussion of the
same).
142
E.g., People v. Martinez, 867 N.E.2d 24, 31–32 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007) (―If
it is improper for the Supreme Court to enlarge the obligations of the United
States under the VCCR, it would arguably be worse for this court to do so. In
sum, defendant has not offered any persuasive reason for this court to abandon
our prior case law and impose the exclusionary rule in cases of alleged Article
36 violations.‖); State v. Morales-Mulato, 744 N.W.2d 679, 686 (Minn. Ct. App.
2008) (reaffirming its decision prior to Sanchez-Llamas that suppression is not
an appropriate remedy).
143
People v. Aybar, No. 7052/95, 2006 WL 2918218, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Oct. 12, 2006).
144
E.g., State v. Cabrera, 903 A.2d 427, 430 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div.
2006) (―To the extent state courts may apply their own rules of law, the
[VCCR], which provides only for notification . . . presents no basis for either
requiring the suppression of evidence for noncompliance, development of
independent rules of law, or departure from the law as it now stands in New
Jersey . . . .‖); Sierra v. State, 218 S.W.3d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (noting
that Article 36 violations do not warrant suppression under the state
exclusionary rule).
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courts, the exclusionary rule will continue to be denied as a remedy
for Article 36 violations.145
2. Civil Remedies
In the absence of a satisfactory remedy in criminal
prosecutions, foreign nationals can sue the state and municipal
actors who allegedly violated their VCCR rights.146 There may,
indeed, be some deterrent value in pursuing civil liability for police
misconduct.147 There are two federal statutes through which
foreign nationals can potentially seek redress for Article 36
violations: 1) Alien Tort Statute (―ATS‖), 28 U.S.C. § 1350 148 and
2) 42 U.S.C. § 1983.149
145

As noted by the Court in Sanchez-Llamas, Article 36 violations may be
considered as a factor in a broader challenge to voluntariness of statements or
effectiveness of counsel. 548 U.S. at 350. Some state courts have encountered
such challenges and, thus far, defendants have been unable to leverage Article
36 violations effectively in voluntariness and effective counsel challenges. See,
e.g., Anaya-Plasencia v. State, 642 S.E.2d 401, 403 (Ga. Ct. App. 2007)
(denying claim that Article 36 violation ―rendered [defendant‘s] statement
involuntary‖); see also Lugo v. State, No. SC06-1532, 2008 WL 4489274, at
*17 (Fla. Oct. 8, 2008) (denying ineffective counsel claim based on failure to
raise issue of VCCR violation at trial court ―since trial counsel is not ineffective
for the failure to raise [the] nonmeritorious issue‖).
146
Federal statutes allow civil suits against state actors who violate the
Constitution or its treaties. See Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2004); 42
U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
147
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006) (suggesting that
―civil liability is an effective deterrent . . .‖).
148
28 U.S.C. § 1350 states: ―The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.‖ The ATS confers more
than jurisdiction; it allows courts to ―recognize private causes of action for
certain torts in violation of the law of nations . . . .‖ Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain,
542 U.S. 692, 724 (2004).
149
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or
other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,
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a. Alien Tort Statute

Claims made pursuant to the ATS must be supported by a
―customary international law tort‖ that is ―both specific and wellaccepted.‖150 It is, however, unlikely that any defendant will be
able to establish a customary international law tort based on an
Article 36 violation given this high bar. 151 First, ―[a] violation of
Article 36(1)(b)(third) by itself would not meet the specificity
requirement for recognition of an ATS cause of action.‖ 152 The
Second Circuit—the only circuit court to reach the issue—
considered and rejected a version of an ―unlawful detention‖ tort
because it was not ―well-accepted‖ in the international
community. 153 Thus, it seems that ATS is unavailable to foreign
nationals seeking to pursue civil liability for VCCR violations. 154
b. 42 U.S.C. § 1983
Claims brought under section 1983 seem more promising.155
shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer‘s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a
declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.
For the purposes of this section, any Act of Congress applicable
exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.
150
Mora v. New York, 524 F.3d 183, 208 (2d Cir. 2008) (citing Sosa, 542
U.S. at 725).
151
See id. (―[O]nly a ‗modest number‘ of customary international law torts
are cognizable under the ATS . . . [in part because of] the ‗collateral
consequences of making international rules privately actionable . . . .‘‖ (quoting
Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725)).
152
Id. at 208 n.31 (analyzing the possibility of a cause of action under the
ATS within the Sosa framework).
153
Id. at 208–09.
154
See id.
155
A plaintiff need only establish that an individual right exists to bring a
cause of action under section 1983. Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 284
(2002). When a treaty is the basis for a section 1983 action, the plaintiff must
also establish that the treaty is self-executing. Cornejo v. San Diego, 504 F.3d
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Assuming arguendo that an individually enforceable right exists
under Article 36, that right is automatically enforceable under
section 1983.156 The cause of action, then, simply becomes the
violation of Article 36 for which the foreign national would be
entitled to civil damages.157 The issue, however, is that law
enforcement officials will almost inevitably raise the wellestablished affirmative defense of qualified immunity. 158
Typically, qualified immunity shields law enforcement officials
from civil liability so long as ―their conduct does not violate
clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a
reasonable person would have known.‖ 159 The rationale behind the
availability of such a defense is not merely to protect individual
defendants, but society as a whole. 160 When government officials
are sued, society bears the costs of litigation, the diversion of
government resources, and the deterrence of potential public
servants.161 Courts presented with these suits must weigh not only
the value of allowing civil liability for the violation to the litigants,
but to all of society.162 As a result, decisions about the validity of a
qualified immunity defense must be made early in the litigation. 163
853, 856 (9th Cir. 2007). Even though the Supreme Court has yet to rule
definitively, Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1357 n.4 (2008), the lower
courts assume that the VCCR is self-executing. E.g., Gandara v. Bennett, 528
F.3d 823, 828 (11th Cir. 2008). Thus, it is easier to establish a cause of action
under section 1983 than the ATS where the plaintiff must establish a customary
international law tort. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
156
See Gonzaga, 536 U.S. at 284 (―Once a plaintiff demonstrates that a
statute confers an individual right, the right is presumptively enforceable by
§ 1983.‖).
157
See supra note 155 (detailed discussion of section 1983 requirements).
158
The only circuit court to find an individually enforceable right and allow
a suit under section 1983 noted the potential use of this defense. Jogi v. Voges,
480 F.3d 822, 836 (7th Cir. 2007).
159
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
160
Id. at 814.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) (noting that qualified
immunity is meant to ―spare [defendants] not only unwarranted liability, but
unwarranted demands customarily imposed upon those defending a long drawn
out lawsuit‖) (quoting Siegert v. Gilley, 500 U.S. 226, 232 (1991)).
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As such, the threat of suit may well serve as a sufficient deterrent
when the alleged violation was of a clearly established right.164
However, rights under Article 36 can hardly be described as
clearly established. 165 Supreme Court precedent is not necessary to
clearly establish a right,166 but ―[t]he contours of the right must be
sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand that
what he is doing violates that right.‖167 Given that judges cannot
find common ground on the issue of what Article 36 guarantees an
individual, it seems unreasonable to expect law enforcement
officers to know what rights exist under Article 36. 168 The
likelihood of a successful qualified immunity defense early-on in
litigation,169 therefore, seems likely to nullify any potential
deterrent effects and prevent individuals from successfully
recovering damages to cure specific violations of the VCCR.
Courts could potentially make an exception to qualified
immunity for the implementation of treaty rights with the idea of
compliance in mind. 170 As noted by one scholar, ―[i]f the United
States uses private judicial enforcement to achieve the same result
another nation could achieve by executive decree, it has not done
any more vis-à-vis its international obligations than the other
nation.‖171 The use of private remedies, though, imposes greater
164

See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
See discussion supra Part II.A.
166
See Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 739 (2002) (―This is not to say that an
official action is protected by qualified immunity unless the very action in
question has previously been held unlawful.‖) (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472
U.S. 511, 535 n.12 (1985)).
167
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
168
See Wilson, 526 U.S. at 617–18 (―If judges [] disagree on a
constitutional question, it is unfair to subject police to money damages for
picking the losing side of the controversy.‖).
169
See Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 507 (1978) (noting the basis for
allowing qualified immunity is to allow ―insubstantial lawsuits [to] be quickly
terminated‖).
170
E.g., Chaney v. Orlando, 291 Fed. Appx. 238, 244 (11th Cir. 2008)
(noting a narrow exception to qualified immunity whereby an ―officer‘s conduct
[is] so outrageous as to be unconstitutional ‗even without case law on point‘‖)
(quoting Priester v. Riviera Beach, 208 F.3d 919, 926 (11th Cir. 2000)).
171
Recent Case: Foreign Relations Law -- Treaty Remedies -- Ninth Circuit
165
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costs on society than necessary to ensure compliance. 172 Other
methods of ensuring compliance not only impose fewer costs on
society as a whole, but can be just as effective, if not more so, in
enforcing the VCCR domestically. 173
III. ENFORCING COMPLIANCE WITHOUT JUDICIAL REMEDIES
There is no denying that under some circumstances, judicial
remedies are the most effective means of ensuring the protection of
citizens and indeed non-citizens throughout a criminal
prosecution. 174 The available remedies, however, often come at an
extremely high cost to society. 175 As such, courts have always been
reluctant to apply those remedies except to protect the most
fundamental rights from the most abhorrent police behavior.176
Any right provided to a foreign national under Article 36 does not
rise to that level, nor does a violation of that ―right.‖177 As an
international treaty obligation, though, it is essential that the
United States comply with Article 36. 178
Holds that § 1983 Does Not Provide a Right of Action for Violations of the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 121 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1683
(2008).
172
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
173
See discussion infra Part III.B.
174
See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 348 (1974) (―As with any
remedial device, the application of the [exclusionary] rule has been restricted to
those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously
served.‖).
175
See Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 596 (2006) (discussing the high
cost of the exclusionary rule); Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982)
(discussing the high cost of civil liability).
176
E.g., Hudson, 547 U.S. at 598 (refusing to apply the exclusionary rule to
the ―knock-and-announce‖ requirement).
177
See United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377, 390 (6th Cir. 2001)
(finding that Article 36 does not establish any fundamental rights on the level of
constitutional rights).
178
See Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1367 (2008) (recognizing the
United States‘ compelling interest in ―ensuring the reciprocal observance of the
[VCCR], protecting relations with foreign governments, and demonstrating
commitment to the role of international law‖); see also Asa W. Markel,
International Law and Consular Immunity, 43 ARIZ ATT‘Y 22, 22 (2007)
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A. Current Federal and State Policies

The federal government has taken steps toward ensuring
compliance among its own law enforcement agencies through
executive regulations.179 For example, the Department of Justice
(―DOJ‖) requires that arresting officers inform every foreign
national that his or her consulate can be notified if he or she so
requests.180 The officer must then report to the nearest United
States Attorney‘s Office (―USAO‖), which must then either notify
the appropriate consulate as requested or even where not requested
as mandated by treaty. 181 The law enforcement agencies and
USAOs, as agencies under the DOJ, are directly accountable to the
DOJ for any compliance issues.182 This scheme ensures
compliance through the supervisory relationship of the DOJ to its
subsidiary agencies—USAOs and law enforcement agencies (i.e.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Drug Enforcement Agency,
etc.).183 Similarly, the Department of Homeland Security has
adopted its own procedures to meet the consular notification
requirements.184 Because federal law enforcement answers directly
to the United States government, these measures ensure
compliance by such agencies.185
The federal system accounts for only a small portion of total
arrests in the country and thus, it can reasonably be concluded that
federal law enforcement‘s compliance with the VCCR affects a
very small portion of the foreign nationals arrested on U.S. soil. 186
(―[I]nternational law . . . is based on reciprocity between nations.‖); Samson,
supra note 118, at 1112 (―When Nations sign treaties, they do so with the good
faith belief that the other signatories will uphold their obligations.‖).
179
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (2007).
180
28 C.F.R. § 50.5(a)(1).
181
28 C.F.R. § 50.5.
182
See 28 C.F.R. § 0.5 (1997) (noting the supervisory power of the
Attorney General over all of DOJ including the U.S. Attorneys).
183
28 C.F.R. § 0.1 (2007) (listing the agencies under DOJ).
184
See 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e) (Department of Homeland Security).
185
See 28 C.F.R. § 50.5 (directing compliance by DOJ agencies with the
VCCR).
186
―The federal government estimates it makes about 140,000 arrests each
year.‖ Feds to Collect DNA in Every Arrest, USA TODAY, Apr. 16, 2008,
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Given this assumption, the vast majority of foreign nationals,
therefore, fall under the jurisdiction of the states.187 As such, the
United States Department of State (―State Department‖) has taken
an active role in helping states implement the requirements of
Article 36 and similar provisions in other treaties that address
consular notification.188 The State Department maintains a
comprehensive website to convey its views about consular
notification, to describe the consular notification requirements of
applicable treaties, and to assist state and local law enforcement in
complying with the requirements. 189 The website admonishes the
government officials for whom the site is designed that their
―cooperation in ensuring that foreign nationals in the United States
are treated in accordance with these instructions permits the United
States to comply with its consular legal obligations domestically
and will ensure that the United States can insist upon rigorous
compliance by foreign governments with respect to U.S. citizens
abroad.‖190 In addressing failure to notify, the State Department
asserts that it will ―take appropriate action‖ by investigating
complaints and intervening as necessary to ensure compliance and
address the concerns of the sending state.191 The State Department
http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2008-04-16-fed-dna_N.htm
(last
visited Feb. 17, 2009). By contrast, the federal government estimates over
fourteen million total arrests in the United States each year. See U.S.
Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime in the United
States 2007, Table 29, Sept. 2008, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/cius2007/
data/table_29.html.
187
See supra note 186.
188
In addition to the VCCR, the United States is a signatory of agreements
with over fifty countries that mandate consular notification upon detaining a
foreign national, not withstanding any wishes against notification that a foreign
national may have. United States Department of State, Consular Notification and
Access, Part 5: Legal Material, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular
_744.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009). For a list of countries covered by such
bilateral treaties, please see the State Department website. Id.
189
See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification
and Access, http://travel.state. gov/law/consular/consular_753.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009).
190
Id.
191
United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access,
Part 3: FAQs, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_748.html (last visited
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suggests that the proper response is either immediate notification
as soon as the agency is aware of the failure so that the consulate
can exercise its rights, or an apology to the sending state and
efforts to prevent future breaches. 192
The website also provides law enforcement officials with the
relevant background information on consular notification,
including a brief explanation of the VCCR, the text of Article 36,
and State Department‘s views on the basis for implementing it.193
In reference to implementing the VCCR, the State Department
asserts that the Supremacy Clause binds all federal, state and local
law enforcement officials to comply with the VCCR and that this
is best accomplished through directives, orders, and police manuals
issued by individual jurisdictions.194 Given this policy, the website
provides ample resources to law enforcement officials to
implement consular notification.195 The website allows
government officials of any federal, state, or local agency to order,
free of charge, ―Consular Notification and Access‖ booklets,
training videos, consular notification pocket cards, and a CD-ROM
with training materials. 196 The booklets and the pocket cards
contain suggested wording for notifying foreign nationals of the
consular notification provision197 and the website and CD-ROM
Feb. 17, 2009).
192
Id.
193
See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification
and Access, Part 5: Legal Material, supra note 188.
194
Id.
195
See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification
and Access, supra note 189.
196
United States Department of State, Consular Notification Materials
Order Form, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_726.html (last visited
Feb. 17, 2009). The information contained in all of these materials is also
available on the website itself. See generally United States Department of State,
Consular Notification and Access, supra note 189.
197
The State Department promulgates two suggested wordings, one based
on the VCCR where notification is optional per the foreign national‘s discretion
and the other based on the bilateral treaties where notification is mandatory.
United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access, Part 1:
Basic Instructions, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_737.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
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make versions of this wording available in other languages. 198 The
State Department further eases the burden on law enforcement
officials by including the contact information for all consulate
offices and a form fax sheet to notify those offices. 199 It also
engages in outreach and training around the country to educate law
enforcement about the notification requirements and improve
compliance. 200 As evidenced by the multitude of information,
policy statements, and resources on the State Department website,
the federal government is committed to ensuring compliance and
has made significant steps toward compliance, thus far, without the
use of judicial remedies. 201
Law enforcement agencies have, on their own, shown a
commitment to increasing compliance with the consular
notification requirements. The Commission on Accreditation for
Law Enforcement Agencies, Inc. (―CALEA‖) 202 adopted a
consular notification and access (―CNA‖) standard that will now
be required for accredited law enforcement agencies. 203 This
198

United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access,
Part 4: Translations, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_749.html (last
visited Feb. 17, 2009).
199
United States Department of State, Consular Notification and Access,
Part Six: Foreign Embassies and Consulates in the United States,
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_745.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2009).
200
United States Department of State, Training and Outreach,
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_2244.html (last visited Feb. 17,
2009). The Department has conducted approximately 450 training sessions,
―distributed over 1,000,000 pieces of training materials,‖ and published articles
in law enforcement publications to raise awareness. Id.
201
See generally United States Department of State, Consular Notification
and Access, supra note 189.
202
The CALEA is a credentialing authority established in 1979 by four
major law enforcement associations ―to improve the delivery of public safety
services, primarily by: maintaining a body of standards, developed by public
safety practitioners, covering a wide range of up-to-date public safety initiatives;
establishing and administering an accreditation process; and recognizing
professional excellence.‖ Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement
Agencies, Inc., About CALEA, http://www.calea.org/Online/AboutCALEA/
Commission.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2009) [hereinafter CALEA].
203
See generally Mark Warren, Consular Notification: Statutory and
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standard requires agencies to adopt Standard Operating Procedures
that ensure compliance with the VCCR and other consular
notification agreements.204 While CALEA membership is
voluntary, its members represent more than 80% of law
enforcement agencies in the United States; as such, its views
represent a significant portion of law enforcement.205 The CNA
standard, in particular, demonstrates the growing knowledge of
consular notification and general willingness and desire of the law
enforcement community to bring agencies into compliance. 206
To date, two state legislatures have taken steps to ensure
compliance by their own law enforcement officials by codifying
procedures for consular notification: California and Oregon.207
Other states, most notably Georgia, have utilized official law
enforcement manuals to implement consular notification. 208 In
some cases, specific local police departments have utilized their
own patrol manuals to implement notification. 209 It is clear that
strides are being made in the area of consular notification
Regulatory Provisions, http://users.xplornet.com/~mwarren/compliance.htm
(last visited Apr. 5, 2009).
204
See id. (citing the CALEA standard in its entirety). The State
Department prepared a model CNA Standard Operating Procedure (―SOP‖) for
use by any government agency; the State Department recommends that every
agency use this model or develop similar SOPs regardless of their affiliation
with CALEA. United States Department of State, Download a Model CNA
Standard Operating Procedure, http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular
_3002.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
205
United States Department of State, Training and Outreach, supra note
200.
206
The Supreme Court recently noted that the increase in the
―professionalism of police forces, including internal police discipline‖ acts as a
civil rights violations deterrent. Hudson v. Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 598 (2006).
CALEA is an example of the increased professionalism and its adoption of the
CNA acts similarly as a deterrent for consular notification violations. See
CALEA, supra note 202.
207
Warren, supra note 203. See also CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c (West
2000); OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642 (2008).
208
See Warren, supra note 203.
209
See id. (listing the manuals of New York Police Department, Los
Angeles Police Department, and Lubbock (Texas) Independent School District
Police).
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compliance within the United States at the federal, state, and local
levels. 210 This is not to say, however, that there is no room for
improvement.
B. Trust the States to Fill the Gap
The federal government is ultimately liable for the failure of
state and local agencies to abide by the terms of the VCCR;
however, that does not mean that only the federal government can
effectively enforce the provisions of the VCCR.211 Because the
majority of all arrests are under state jurisdiction, the arrests of
most foreign nationals—and thus, violations of Article 36—also
fall under state jurisdiction.212 Therefore, Article 36 compliance is
best left primarily in the hands of the states because: 1) the ways in
which the federal government can compel compliance will be less
effective and less efficient than allowing the states to deal with the
issue on their own, and 2) under our federalist system, the states
often take an active role in treaty implementation and Article 36
particularly warrants such a state role.
The federal government‘s hands are virtually tied by state
sovereignty under the current system. 213 Having ruled out judicial
remedies as a means of enforcement,214 the legislative and
210

It should be noted that the methods of compliance employed by federal
and state agencies closely mimic the efforts in other countries who are party to
the VCCR. See id. (listing various foreign codes that address implementation of
the VCCR). Some countries, for instance Australia, require notification prior to
questioning, but this goes beyond the requirements of the VCCR, which
prescribed nothing more than notification without undue delay. See id.
211
See Ku, supra note 138, at 521 (giving examples of states enforcing
international obligations).
212
See supra note 186–87 and accompanying text.
213
Federal courts cannot use their supervisory power to force states into
compliance. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438 (2000). It is
beyond Congress‘ power to regulate state criminal laws and procedures. See
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
214
A bill introduced in the House of Representatives, H.R. 6481: Avena
Case Implementation Act of 2008, proposes ―to create a civil action to provide
judicial remedies to carry out certain treaty obligations of the [U.S.] under the
[VCCR].‖ Avena Case Implementation Act of 2008, H.R. 6481, 110th Cong.
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executive branches have few viable options to enforce the VCCR
directly. Congress could authorize and require a federal agency to
interview all new inmates in state facilities to determine their
citizenship status.215 While this solution would certainly guarantee
that every foreign national is given the option of consular
notification, the practicality of such a scheme seems shaky at
best.216 To screen every one of the fourteen million arrestees each
year would require an enormous amount of manpower and
money. 217 Moreover, there are no statistics indicating what
percentage of these arrests are of foreign nationals, so this extreme
expenditure of time and money may only be beneficial to a small
percentage of all arrestees. 218 Without concrete proof, or even a
suggestion, that the benefits would be much more substantial, this
seems an impractical solution. Congress cannot go much further
than this to directly enforce the VCCR in state arrests because
Congress cannot mandate that state courts apply specific
procedural rules, nor can it require state legislatures to amend their
criminal laws and procedures.219
(2008), available at http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h110-6481
(last visited February 12, 2009). The bill was introduced in July 2008 and has
been referred to the House Committee on the Judiciary. Id. The bill is tailored
specifically to remedy Article 36 violations. Id.
215
Molora Vadnais, Comment, A Diplomatic Morass: An Argument
Against Judicial Involvement in Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on
Consular Relations, 47 UCLA L. REV. 307, 336 (1999).
216
See U.S. Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Crime
in the United States 2007, Table 29, supra note 186.
217
See id.
218
The federal government and state governments keep statistics of all
arrests, but while these statistics include a breakdown of arrests by types of
crime, age, and region, these reports do not include a breakdown of arrests by
nationality or citizenship status. E.g., Department of Justice, Federal Bureau of
Investigation, Crime in the United States 2007, http://www.fbi.gov/ucr
/cius2007/arrests/index.html (last visited Feb. 17, 2009); California Office of the
Attorney
General,
Arrests
Statistics,
http://ag.ca.gov/cjsc/statistics
datatabs/dtabsarrests.php (last visited Feb. 17, 2009); New York Division of
Criminal Justice Services, Criminal Justice Statistics, http://criminaljustice.
state.ny.us/crimnet/ojsa/stats.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2009).
219
This is outside the scope of Congress‘ constitutional authority. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Likewise, there is little that the Executive Branch can do to
directly enforce adherence to Article 36 by state officials. 220 The
Attorney General could bring suits against offending states as it
has done in the past when state and local governments have
violated treaty obligations.221 Indeed, this solution could be an
effective deterrent to violations of Article 36, but it will result in
costly litigation, which will ultimately cost taxpayer dollars on the
local, state, and federal level. 222 It would be more efficient and
cost-effective to prevent violations from the outset than
retroactively sue every offending locality. 223
While there is not much that the federal government can do to
directly enforce the VCCR, actions taken by the federal
government can indirectly impact the enforcement of the VCCR in
state criminal systems.224 By enacting a consular notification
funding statute, Congress can provide incentives to states that will
encourage compliance.225 For instance, Congress could implement
a consular notification program that would require states to issue
reports regarding foreign nationals‘ arrests and to provide
documentation of action taken regarding consular notification; in
exchange, Congress would provide funds to support those
procedures.226 The Executive Branch, via the State Department,
220

See Samson, supra note 118, at 1118 (enumerating ways in which the
Executive Branch could ensure compliance).
221
Id.
222
The costs of litigation instituted by the Attorney General against state
entities will be similar to at least the monetary expense and diversion of
resources discussed in context of traditional civil remedies. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982).
223
See Mark J. Kadish & Charles C. Olson, Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon and
Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: The Supreme Court,
The Right to Consul, and Remediation, 27 MICH. J. INT‘L L. 1185, 1228 (2006)
(suggesting that preventative efforts are an effective means of enforcing Article
36).
224
See Vadnais, supra note 215, at 336 (enumerating actions Congress can
take to directly and indirectly impact compliance).
225
Id.
226
This is the basic structure of any congressional funding statute designed
to bring states into compliance with burdensome regulations. For example, the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Improvement Act (IDEA) provides
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has already taken steps to indirectly impact the enforcement of the
VCCR by raising awareness of the provision, and providing
training and materials to state and local officials to ease the burden
of compliance.227
Ultimately, though, the federal government need not and
should not go any farther to implement the requirements of the
VCCR among state and local jurisdictions. The consular
notification provision directly affects the states‘ individual
criminal justice systems, since it requires that every arrested or
detained foreign national within the United States border have the
option of notifying his or her consulate. 228 Each state sets and
adheres to its own criminal law and procedures.229 Because the
criminal law is entirely an issue of each state‘s jurisdiction, states
are the proper authority to address the consular notification
provision.230 State control in implementing foreign policy is by no
means a novel idea—historically, states have independently
handled issues of ―consular powers in estate proceedings [and] the
immunity of foreign states from taxation . . . .‖231 In modern times,
aside from consular notification obligations, states are also
responsible for implementing the requirements of international
human rights treaties. 232 As argued by one scholar, ―the reason the
states hold that power is because the foreign policy question[s]
funding to states that follow prescribed rules and regulations regarding services
provided to children with disabilities. See Individual with Disabilities Education
Improvement Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1407, 1411–13, 1415–19 (2004).
227
See supra notes 195–200 and accompanying text.
228
See VCCR, supra note 1, art. 36.
229
See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL, NANCY J. KING & ORIN S.
KERR, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 1.2(b) (3d ed. 2008).
230
See Vadnais, supra note 215, at 312 (noting the constitutional quandary
in having state officers implement the VCCR pursuant to some congressional or
federal court mandate).
231
Ku, supra note 138, at 478.
232
Id. at 521 (citing a declaration by Congress that accompanied
ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights that
interpreted the agreement as binding the federal government on matters within
its jurisdiction and leaving implementation of matters within state jurisdiction to
states with the caveat that the federal government ―take measures for the
fulfillment‖ of those obligations).
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directly implicate[] matter[s] of state control.‖233 This scholar
contends that in leaving these issues to the states, the federal
government is acknowledging the importance of state
sovereignty. 234 Barring some need for absolute uniformity, there is
no need for the federal government to directly implement the
requirements of Article 36 and ignore state sovereignty over their
own criminal justice systems.235
Absolute uniformity in implementing the consular notification
provision is not a necessity since the VCCR itself speaks only very
broadly about what receiving states must do with respect to
consular notification.236 This suggests that each receiving state has
the power to devise its own procedures for implementation under
the treaty—suggesting that uniformity of implementation is not
necessary under the VCCR. 237 Thus, there is no reason that every
state within the United States must utilize the same procedures.238
As such, states should be allowed to continue to implement the
provision as they see fit.
Arguments in favor of judicial remedies or direct intervention
by the federal government in the case of Article 36 inevitably
assume that states, left to their own devices, will not comply.239
According to one legal scholar, state noncompliance stems from:
1) lack of knowledge on the part of law enforcement officials,
233

Id. at 520.
Id.
235
See Kathleen Patchel, Memorandum to Participants in October 7, 2007
Informational Meeting Regarding Treaty Implementation, at 8 (Sept. 28, 2007),
available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/archives/ulc/jeb/patchel_memo.pdf
(noting that where lack of uniformity is not problematic, state implementation
may be a ―reasonable and feasible alternative‖).
236
See VCCR, supra note 1.
237
See id.
238
See Patchel, supra note 235, at 8 (noting that where lack of uniformity is
not problematic, state implementation may be a ―reasonable and feasible
alternative‖).
239
E.g., Asa Markel, The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: After
the Federal Courts’ Abdication, Will State Courts Fill in the Breach?, 7 CHI.KENT J. INT‘L COMP. L. 1, 30 (2007) (implying that the Supreme Court‘s holding
in Sanchez-Llamas in favor of states‘ rights will adversely affect U.S. treaty
obligations of the VCCR).
234
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2) inability or unwillingness to bear the burden of notifying foreign
nationals, 3) difficulty in distinguishing between citizens and
foreign nationals due to the diversity of American citizens, and
4) failure from the outset by the federal and, by default, state
governments to take the notification requirements seriously. 240
However, these issues have either already been extinguished or are
easily addressed.
Both the first and last issues—lack of knowledge and failure to
take the requirements seriously—no longer exist.241 SanchezLlamas v. Oregon and Medellin v. Texas242 have brought both
national and international attention to the requirements of Article
36.243 Should state officials somehow have missed these important
cases, the State Department took steps to put state officials on
notice of the consular notification provision. 244 These steps by the
State Department not only ensure that officials are aware of the
provision, but also exemplify the federal government‘s

240

Vadnais, supra note 215, at 332–33.
See, e.g., United States Department of State, Consular Notification and
Access, supra note 189 (serving as an example that knowledge among
individual enforcement agencies is increasing and that the federal government,
at least, is taking the provision seriously).
242
This case centered on fifty-one Mexican nationals who were sentenced
to the death penalty in Texas without being informed of the consular notification
provision in Article 36. Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1352 (2008).
Mexico brought a case on behalf of its nationals before the International Court
of Justice which ruled against the United States and asked for ―review and
reconsideration‖ of the convictions. Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex.
v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12, 72 (March 31). The Supreme Court held that an ICJ
ruling was not binding on the state courts. Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1367.
243
See, e.g., Jeffrey Davidow, Protecting Them Protects Us; Why You
Should Care About What Happens to 51 Mexican Nationals on Death Row, L.A.
TIMES, Aug. 4, 2008, at A15; Linda Greenhouse, Justices Hear Arguments Over
Whether Foreigners Have Reciprocal Rights in the U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2006, at A19.
244
The State Department periodically sends notice to state governors and
state attorneys general regarding the consular notification provision, as well as
pocket-sized reference cards for distribution to law enforcement officers.
Vadnais, supra note 215, at 333. See also discussion of State Department
website and training efforts supra Part III.A.
241
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commitment to enforcing Article 36. 245 Procedural safeguards
implemented by the DOJ (and similarly situated executive
offices)246 further demonstrate the seriousness with which the
federal government now takes the provision. While it may have
been reasonable to assume that states could or would not comply
because of ignorance or a failure to take the provision seriously ten
years ago,247 recent cases and executive actions have forestalled
such assumptions. 248
The second and third issues—difficulty in identifying foreign
nationals, and unwillingness or inability to bear the burden of
notifying foreign nationals 249—can be easily resolved. If Congress
enacted a funding statute, the federal government—not individual
states—would bear the cost of enforcing the provision, which
should alleviate concerns that states will not comply because of the
financial burden of enforcement.250 Furthermore, the State
Department has offered materials to ease any administrative
burdens, both in providing a ready-made program for
implementation so no resources need to be expended on
developing procedures251 and in creating materials that make
implementation easy for officers on a day-to-day basis.252
Therefore, the proposed method, in which Congress enacts a
funding statute, in combination with the current practices of the
federal government, would eliminate the traditional excuses
against state implementation of the VCCR.

245

Colter Paulson, Compliance with Final Judgments of the International
Court of Justice Since 1987, 98 AM. J. INT‘L L. 434, 444 (2004) (discussing the
ICJ‘s commendation of the increased State Department efforts as a ―good faith
effort‖ to comply with the VCCR).
246
See supra notes 179–85 and accompanying text.
247
See generally Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998) (first
Supreme Court Article 36 case).
248
See supra notes 242–46 and accompanying text.
249
See Vadnais, supra note 215, at 332–33.
250
See supra note 224–25 and accompanying text.
251
United States Department of State, Download a Model CNA Standard
Operating Procedure, supra note 204.
252
See discussion of State Department training material, supra Part III.A.
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Not only are the states capable of implementing the VCCR,
there is merit in allowing states to do so.253 Aside from the
importance of preserving state sovereignty, allowing states to
spearhead implementation on their own can lead to greater, more
effective execution of such rights by permitting experimentation
with different procedures and approaches. 254 Some methods may
prove more effective or more efficient than others; those methods
can in turn be adopted by other jurisdictions.255 Also, some
procedures may be well-suited for states with large populations of
foreign nationals, but not for those with smaller concentrations of
foreign nationals. 256 Allowing flexibility in implementation will
allow the most effective and efficient means of compliance within
each jurisdiction. In fact, this would be consistent with the spirit of
the provision, which recognizes that different methods may be
more or less effective in different legal systems, and thus
purposefully leaves implementation to each nation. 257 In sum, the
choice of specific procedures to implement the requirements of
Article 36 should be left to the states because they can more
effectively and efficiently enforce compliance than the federal
government. The federal government should merely supplement
states‘ efforts to ease the administrative and financial burdens
states face in complying with an international treaty obligation.
253

See Patchel, supra note 235, at 11 (discussing the advantages of
conditional spending as the implementation of treaty obligations where states
retain primary control).
254
See Brian Galle, Federal Grants, State Decisions, 88 B.U. L. REV. 875,
911 (2008) (―Diversity produces many good ends such as . . . chances to
experiment with different solutions to similar problems . . . .‖).
255
See id. (―Diversity produces many good ends such as . . . competitive
pressures on local governments to adopt the most appealing of these
solutions.‖).
256
The distribution of foreign nationals is uneven with California, New
York, Texas and Florida harboring a majority of all foreign nationals in the U.S.
See, e.g., Department of Homeland Security, Mapping Immigration: Legal
Permanent Residents (LPRs), http://www.dhs.gov/ximgtn/statistics/data/
lprmaps.shtm (follow ―Total LPR Flow by State‖ ―2000-2003‖ and ―1990-1999‖
hyperlinks) (last visited Feb. 14, 2009) (graphs showing total legal permanent
resident flow by state).
257
See generally VCCR, supra note 1.
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CONCLUSION
There is no denying the importance of Article 36 of the VCCR.
As Jeffrey Davidow, former U.S. statesman, 258 put it, ―[n]o citizen
is in more need of consular support than the one who faces the
terrifying ordeal of arrest and imprisonment under a foreign legal
system.‖259 The consular notification provision gives at least some
assurance to travelers that if necessary, they have at least one ally
in their country throughout such an ordeal. Enforcing compliance
with the provision domestically strengthens U.S. use of the
provision when its own citizens are in trouble abroad.260 However,
to assume that judicial remedies are the best and only option
available to give effect to the provision ignores both the
construction of the treaty and the alternative forms of compliance.
First, by way of modern treaty interpretation as employed by
U.S. courts, the VCCR does not confer any individually
enforceable rights on foreign nationals.261 Second, the VCCR
provides no specific judicial remedies, and no domestic judicial
remedies are well-suited to address the consular notification
provision—even if the treaty is read to encompass individual
rights.262 Finally, the federal government has already taken
effective steps to ensure compliance within federal law
enforcement agencies.263 States have not yet uniformly adopted
any such steps;264 however, given a ―funding statute‖ and guidance
from the State Department, states are capable of ensuring
compliance on their own. This method of compliance that works
with, rather than competes with, federalism is both an effective and
258

Jeffrey Davidow served as ―U.S. ambassador to Zambia, Venezuela and
Mexico in the Reagan, Clinton, and both Bush administrations.‖ Davidow, supra
note 243.
259
Id.
260
See Breard v. Pruett, 134 F.3d 615, 622 (4th Cir. 1998) (Butzner, J.,
concurring) (discussing the increased likelihood that U.S. citizens abroad will be
denied access to their consulate if the U.S. fails to comply with the VCCR).
261
See supra Part II.A.
262
See supra Part II.B.
263
See, e.g., 28 C.F.R. § 50.5; 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(e).
264
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834c; OR. REV. STAT. § 181.642.
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efficient solution to the problem of consular notification
compliance in the United States.

